The Unwritten Authority the United States Just Claimed
The United States has removed foreign leaders before, but it has rarely done so while insisting it was executing criminal process and simultaneously assuming responsibility for what remained of the state.
By Sean Hart
January 4, 2026
The United States has removed foreign leaders before, but it has rarely done so while insisting it was executing criminal process and simultaneously assuming responsibility for what remained of the state.
The operation against Nicolás Maduro fused indictment, military force, and provisional governance into a single act, creating a legal category the Constitution and international law have never clearly recognized.
What Happened
President Donald Trump said U.S. forces seized Maduro inside Venezuela and removed him to face federal criminal charges in the United States. Administration officials framed the operation as the execution of long-standing narcotics and terrorism indictments rather than an act of war.
Within hours, Trump said the United States would “run” Venezuela temporarily while a transition was arranged. No congressional authorization was cited, no new use-of-force resolution was requested, and no international mandate was announced. Venezuelan authorities rejected the legality of the seizure and declared a national emergency, while allied and rival governments focused less on the raid itself than on the authority the United States appeared to claim afterward.
Why This Moment Is Different
The novelty is not the use of force but the theory behind it.
The United States acted as prosecutor, jailer, and provisional steward in a single motion, collapsing distinct sources of legal authority into one claim of action.
American doctrine has traditionally separated these roles. Criminal law governs defendants. War powers govern enemies. Administration governs territory. This operation collapsed those categories without acknowledging the legal consequences that normally attach to any of them.
The result is not merely a controversial action but an unresolved question of authority that now sits at the center of U.S. constitutional and international law.
That question turns on a single legal axis: whether the United States can claim criminal jurisdiction, exercise military force, and assume governing responsibility over another state through the same act. Each claim draws authority from a different legal regime, and none were designed to operate simultaneously.
The Legal Axes
Domestic Constitutional Authority
The administration’s implied claim rests on Article II authority, blending the President’s role as commander in chief with executive control over foreign affairs and federal law enforcement. Framed narrowly, the operation resembles a discrete use of force. Framed functionally, it initiated ongoing responsibility.
The War Powers Resolution does not ask whether an action is labeled “war,” but whether U.S. forces are introduced into hostilities or situations where hostilities are imminent. A public commitment to administer governance complicates any argument that the action was momentary or self-terminating.
If the seizure is treated as criminal process, constitutional expectations about process and accountability follow. If it is treated as military force, congressional war powers constraints follow. The administration’s position appears to seek the advantages of both while inheriting the burdens of neither.
The operation tries to cash an indictment like it is an authorization for war.
The War Authorization Gap
The United States has repeatedly relied on post-9/11 authorizations to justify military operations far from their original scope. Venezuela does not fit cleanly within those precedents.
Absent a new authorization, the operation occupies a legal gray zone in which force is acknowledged but war is denied. That zone can exist briefly. It becomes unstable once the United States claims continuing administrative responsibility.
This is not a semantic dispute. War triggers oversight, funding constraints, alliance obligations, and legal regimes that executives have historically sought to avoid by keeping actions below definitional thresholds. By announcing a governing role, the administration narrowed its own room for legal maneuver.
International Law and Sovereignty
The UN Charter prohibits the use of force against another state’s territorial integrity or political independence, subject to narrow exceptions. Criminal indictment is not among them.
The administration may invoke self-defense, counterterrorism, or transnational criminal disruption. None of those theories traditionally authorize the removal of a sitting head of state followed by asserted custodial control over the government. Consent theories require a legitimate consenting authority, which is precisely what the operation rendered uncertain.
An indictment is not a Charter exception.
Once governance is claimed, the action speaks directly to political independence, the interest the Charter was written to protect.
Head of State Immunity and Jurisdiction
The United States has long argued that certain crimes erode traditional head-of-state immunity. Courts have sometimes accepted that logic at the trial stage. Seizure is a different legal question.
Immunity determines whether a court may hear a case. It does not automatically determine whether military force may be used to obtain the defendant. Even if a leader can be tried, it does not follow that the executive can take him.
By resolving that distinction through force, the administration blurred the line between judicial reach and sovereign restraint, a line other states have historically been eager to redraw in their own favor.
Governance Without the Word Occupation
International humanitarian law does not require the word “occupation” to be spoken. It asks whether a foreign power exercises effective control over territory or core state functions.
The moment the United States described governing Venezuela as a task, it assumed responsibility for outcomes it does not fully control.
The second governance is claimed, governance becomes a liability.
Three Trajectories From Here
Doctrinal Containment
Congress retroactively authorizes or cabins the action, courts avoid the merits, and the episode is absorbed into executive practice as a narrow exception.
Precedent Expansion
Future administrations cite this operation to justify similar actions elsewhere, accelerating the convergence of criminal law and military force into a reusable tool of statecraft.
Legal Backlash
Allies, rivals, or courts treat the episode as a line crossed, hardening norms around sovereignty and immunities in ways that ultimately constrain U.S. flexibility more than before.
Historical Echo and Likely Response
The United States has waged wars, conducted raids, and enforced indictments abroad. It has rarely claimed all three logics at once.
History suggests the hardest phase is not the removal of a leader but the justification of what follows. The law does not merely constrain power. It names it, and names have a way of surviving the moments that create them.
Sources and Reporting Basis
This article is based on contemporaneous reporting from Reuters, The Wall Street Journal, CBS News, ABC News, CNN, Fox News, Al Jazeera, BBC News, and The Guardian, as well as public statements by U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Legal analysis reflects publicly available statutes, constitutional doctrine, and international law frameworks. Certain operational details and the precise scope of U.S. involvement remain subject to clarification.